

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WOOD COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA 2 STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 3 Plaintiff, 4 VS. CASE NOS. 11-F-101 5 16-F-25 THOMAS DEEGAN, 6 Defendant. 8 SENTENCING HEARING 9 The following partial proceeding was held before the Honorable Jeffrey B. Reed, Judge, on the 14th day of April, 10 2016. 11 12 APPEARANCES: 13 MR. SAMUEL C. ROGERS, II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 317 Market Street, Parkersburg, WV 26101. 14 Counsel for the Plaintiff. 15 MR. F. JOHN OSHOWAY, Attorney-at-Law, P. O. Box 156, Grantsville, WV 26147. 16 Standby Counsel for the Defendant. 17 MS. CASEY KUHN, Adult Probation Officer. 18 MR. THOMAS DEEGAN, Defendant. 19 20 21 22 23 CYNTHIA A. SUTPHIN, CER, CET 24 #2 Government Square, Room 221 Parkersburg, WV 26101 25 (304) 424-1721

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## PROCEEDINGS

(Whereupon, the following proceeding was held on the  $14^{\rm th}$ day of April, 2016, beginning at 9:09 a.m. All parties present.)

THE COURT: Case No. 16-F-25 and 11-F-101, both State vs. Thomas Deegan. We're set here for sentencing.

We have the presentence report. We have a supplemental report dated April 13, and another one dated April 9, which was actually I think -- it was received April 5, so I'm assuming that it was misdated. That's the one that contained the defendant's handwritten objections. And I was thinking there was another one, I don't have that here in front of me, another one that -- yeah, and that was April the 5th, and that was the one that dealt with the jail credit.

All right. And the defendant has objected to or filed some objections. Mr. Deegan, is there anything else you want to add to any of your written objections to the presentence report?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I just received one yesterday. It was the officer's sentiment, or something.

THE COURT: Right.

THE DEFENDANT: And in it he was saying that I was noncooperative at the time of arrest, non-cooperative with the investigation, and that I was sarcastic, or a few other terms. But he had testified on the stand that we had never

met or never spoken. So I would object to those as being something that he could not possibly know if he had never met me. He couldn't know I was sarcastic, he couldn't know if I was uncooperative at the time of arrest, he wasn't there. He could say I was uncooperative with his investigation, but, then again, he never talked to me. So how could I not cooperate if no one's ever talked to me. So I would object to those first few portions of that.

Everything else I corrected in the captions, both the previous one, which I had never been allowed to see from April of last year, because there were a lot of errors in it that I saw. Did you get to see that one as well?

THE COURT: Right.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Yeah, no. I noted everything in it.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rogers, is there anything you want to say in response to any of the defendant's objections to the presentence report?

MR. ROGERS: Not -- I mean, not really, Your Honor. A lot of these objections I can't even address due to the nature of the objections that the defendant's making. Some of them I wouldn't have an objection to. The defendant says he quit school in 9<sup>th</sup> grade, not 11<sup>th</sup>. I mean, I wouldn't object to that or have any comment to make. And I don't think that a lot of these corrections that the defendant has

made would have much to do with my arguments on sentencing.

So I wouldn't -- other than that, I wouldn't -- and as far as the officer's sentiment goes and the objections as to those, I don't think I could speak to the officer's sentiment. But I think it -- I mean, it does say how he would characterize the defendant's attitude, it doesn't say how he would characterize his attitude at the time of arrest. So I'd like that to stand for itself, and then wouldn't make any other comments to his objections, other than what I've stated.

THE COURT: Well, you'll have to excuse me for a moment. I must have left something in the office.

(Judge leaves room at 9:15 a.m., and returns at 9:19 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. In terms of the objections to the presentence report in this case, 16-F-25, the majority of the exceptions or objections, I mean, I'm not going to restate, because they really don't affect the sentence. For example, the comment about how to spell the name; comment about pro se; the fact that there's no victim; raise the issue of the name not the defendant. The vast majority of the issues don't affect the sentence, but I want to deal with a couple of them.

One of them is the use of the LSCMI Risk Level. And the use of that is discussed in a January 2015, they're called

memorandum opinions by the West Virginia Supreme Court.

That's the only place I can see it mentioned. It's State vs.

Rogers, the Opinion No. is 14-0373. It's 215 (sic) WL

869323. But it essentially says that the Risk of Needs

Assessments are provided for under West Virginia Code

62-12-6(a)(2), and the purpose of the memorandum opinion was to make clear that these assessments are merely a tool that may be used by circuit judges during sentencing.

So it's not required that the Court consider it, and the Court is not going to consider the LSCMI evaluations for either this case or the other case.

In the official version, there was objection to that.

I'm not going to consider the official version in this case,
because I heard the evidence. And I don't know -- I mean, I
didn't read the official version even before there was an
objection, because I heard the evidence. And it's -- I mean,
that's just my practice. When I have a jury trial and I hear
the evidence, I base a verdict upon the evidence that I hear
at trial, not about what may be included in the official
version, because it's my understanding the official version
generally comes from police reports, which may or may not be
what is -- what the evidence is.

So I did not consider the official version in imposing sentence in this case.

In terms of the presentence report from 11-F-101, there

was something I think on the cover page, yeah, about not knowingly, willingly or intelligently when there's a plea of guilty. We discussed this previously, that certainly the defendant can maintain that. But it's this Court's opinion that if the defendant wants to in any way pursue that as some kind of a collateral attack on that guilty plea in 11-F-101, that the defendant would bear the burden of introducing evidence to that effect. And there's been no evidence presented to that effect.

And so, you know, I mean, certainly he can say that, but the Court doesn't believe that he has -- the Court doesn't believe that I have to rule on that, because in my opinion it's not really been raised.

All the remainder of the corrections or comments to the earlier presentence report, you know, one can make an argument, and it would have, in my opinion, good weight, is that waived -- it's been waived. Because we had a hearing in 11-F-101, we gave the defendant the opportunity to make comments and objections to the presentence report, he was represented by counsel, and it was stated on-the-record at that point that, at least my recollection is, that there weren't any corrections or additions. But whatever corrections or additions were made were dealt with at that time, and sentence was imposed.

But what corrections and additions and comments were

made to that earlier presentence report, again, would not affect the sentence in this case. They're, you know, I don't know how to characterize it, maybe clerical, but it certainly does not, in this Court's opinion, affect the sentence that will be imposed in this case.

So the court reporter is to transcribe the portion of this hearing showing the defendant's objections and the Court's ruling. And that transcript shall be provided to the probation officer, who shall attach the transcript to the presentence report so that the objections and the Court's ruling on the objections and comments can follow the presentence report.

(The portion requested to be transcribed ended at 9:26 a.m.)

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, COUNTY OF WOOD, to-wit:

I, Cynthia A. Sutphin, Certified Electronic Reporter and Transcriber for the Circuit Court of Wood County, West

Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and

correct partial transcript of the proceedings held in the

matter of STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, Plaintiff vs. THOMAS

DEEGAN, Defendant, Case Nos. 11-F-101 and 16-F-25, as

recorded by me on the  $14^{\rm th}$  day of April, 2016.

Given under my hand this 15th day of april 2016.


CYNTHIA A. SUTPHIN, CER, CET

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, COUNTY OF WOOD, to-wit:

I, Cynthia A. Sutphin, Certified Electronic Reporter and Transcriber for the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia, do hereby certify that the transcript within meets the requirements of the Code of the State of West Virginia, Chapter 51, Article 7, Section 4 and all rules pertaining thereto as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals.

DATED: 4/15/16

11-F-101 & 16-F-25 - Sentencing Hearing (4/14/16)





1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WOOD COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA 2 STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 3 Plaintiff, 4 CASE NOS. 11-F-101 VS. 5 16-F-25 THOMAS DEEGAN, 6 Defendant. 7 8 SENTENCING HEARING 9 The following partial proceeding was held before the Honorable Jeffrey B. Reed, Judge, on the 14th day of April, 10 11 2016. 12 APPEARANCES: 13 MR. SAMUEL C. ROGERS, II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 317 Market Street, Parkersburg, WV 26101. Counsel for the Plaintiff. 14 15 MR. F. JOHN OSHOWAY, Attorney-at-Law, P. O. Box 156, Grantsville, WV 26147. 16 Standby Counsel for the Defendant. 17 MS. CASEY KUHN, Adult Probation Officer. 18 MR. THOMAS DEEGAN, Defendant. 19 20 21 22 23 CYNTHIA A. SUTPHIN, CER, CET #2 Government Square, Room 221 Parkersburg, WV 26101 24 25 (304) 424-1721

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## PROCEEDINGS

(Whereupon, the following proceeding was held on the 14<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2016, beginning at 9:26 a.m. All parties present.)

THE COURT: All right. Now, there has been a motion filed by the defendant. It's styled, "Demand and Prayer for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, or in the Alternative, For a New Trial." And so the Court would, of course, treat that as a motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial under rule -- under the criminal rules.

Mr. Deegan, is there anything else you want to add or any evidence you want to present on your motion for judgment of acquittal, or for motion for new trial?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I mean, everything was clear on-therecord from the trial. I stated everything that I thought
needed to be stated within it. I never did receive a
response from the State so that I could see if I needed
anything. I mean, this was something that was drafted mainly
by a bar attorney, and so I figured that it would have at
least gotten a response from the State so that I would know
what their argument was, notice, and I haven't received
anything. So I didn't think that anything needed to be
entered, other than it itself, it's quite clear.

THE COURT: Mr. Rogers, anything you want to say with regard to the motion for judgment of acquittal, or motion for

new trial?

MR. ROGERS: Yes, Your Honor, I'll take up the issues that Mr. Deegan has brought in his motion.

First, it appears to me that the first issue that Mr.

Deegan has is he states that this threat was not communicated as required. Well, I think it was clear in the evidence that we heard during trial that it was absolutely communicated, we heard it. We heard it on the conference call. The jury heard this communication of these terroristic threats. It was communicated to this larger audience over this conference call. It was also communicated over the Internet where the defendant and his group posted this conference call, and it was communicated through interviews that we heard, these threats that the defendant wished to take over the government, and we heard those interviews as well. So I believe that this — these terroristic threats were absolutely communicated.

The defendant also has an issue with the fact that he states that the victim didn't take the stand. This is a crime against the State of West Virginia. The defendant wanted to take over the State's government. We heard from the West Virginia State Police who investigated this crime. We also heard from the Fusion Center and the Wood County Home Confinement Office. We had more than enough evidence through them, as well as the audio and video that we heard, to prove

this case to the jury, and I think that's shown with their verdict.

He questions the constitutionality of the charge. The defendant states that it is protected speech under the Constitution. This has been ruled on. The West Virginia state court -- or Supreme Court has ruled on this issue in <a href="State vs. Yocum">State vs. Yocum</a>. You can't just make terroristic threats that will result in -- could result in serious bodily injury, and the Supreme Court has stated you can't do that. So I don't believe that that's a valid issue.

The defendant brings up jurisdiction issues in personam and political jurisdiction issues. Jurisdiction issues were ruled on and ruled on and ruled on prior to the trial, and the State did prove jurisdiction in its case.

The defendant had an issue with the home confinement office taking the stand. This issue was addressed prior to trial, and the State informed the Court that it needed to present this evidence to show where the defendant was at the time this conference call was taking place, and the Court's already ruled on that issue.

The defendant also has an issue with the recordings and telephone calls, and states that these were downloaded from the Internet without a lawful warrant. These were in a public place. These were on Youtube and open forums where anybody could go on the Internet where a warrant was not

needed.

The defendant has an issue with not getting a continuance of the trial because he states late disclosure of evidence. Again, this was addressed prior to trial. The defendant had an opportunity to have this evidence well before trial. He chose not to get this evidence through his attorney that was appointed, Mr. Oshoway. He chose not to work with Mr. Oshoway. And the State made every possible concession, if you will. We bent over backwards to get this information to the defendant. The Court bent over backwards in talking to the Supreme Court to get this evidence to the defendant. And, again, we've addressed this, and I think the defendant had more than enough time to prepare his case.

The defendant has an issue with the fact that he states that the Court didn't inform the jury of the four prohibited consequences as set out in the code. I believe the defendant is referring to the code which he was charged under where it states that these terroristic threats must be intended to, one of four things, intimidate, of course, civilian population, influence the policy, affect the conduct or a branch of government, or retaliate against a branch of government. These were part of the jury instruction that was actually approved by the defendant. These were part of the jury instructions that went to the jury. They were informed of these four issues in the code, and the State actually went

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over these four, as the defendant states, prohibited consequences as set out in the code as well.

The defendant has an issue with the Court denying the demand for a directed verdict of acquittal. But I think it's clear that the State did -- presented more than enough evidence for a jury to take that evidence back, and come back with a verdict of guilty. And we went over each of those -- each of those elements at that time, at the time that the motion was made.

And I believe that's the issues that the defendant has addressed. For those reasons, I don't believe any of these issues have merit. They have been addressed, and I would ask the Court to dismiss this motion.

THE COURT: Mr. Deegan, anything you want to say in response to anything that the prosecutor said?

MR. DEEGAN: Well, I was having trouble following him since he wasn't going quite in order there. And, of course, his spin on everything is very nice. I think that, yes, it would have been number -- let's see, protected speech, in the first article of amendment, as well as the Constitution of West Virginia. It does clearly state it shall not be abridged, which means it cannot be limited in any way, shape or form.

Number three, there are other ways of proving where a person is, other than using a highly prejudicial home

confinement. They could have used phone records, which were quite available. They had a warrant. They executed a warrant in my home, tore it apart, and took many, many things. So there would have been no problem to get a warrant for the home line that was required for home confinement, and the home line, you have to be at home to use it. And so that would have been evidence of where I was at. And having an officer take the stand and say that I was on home confinement at the time is highly prejudicial.

He talked about the conference call and the video interview, as well as the telephone calls from the Regional Jail. Once again, that was prejudicial in and of itself, because they're testifying that I was in jail while making these phone calls.

There wasn't the proper foundation or authentication required to have those entered into evidence, and the -- yes, the interviews were on the Internet, but they were not available for download. Youtube, you go and you stream it, you watch it there. On the hudok info site, you play the file there. There's nothing that says on either of them that you are permitted to extract it, take a copy of it, and then use it for private purposes of any nature. And that is a seizure of a protected - what would you want to call it - I mean, it's personal -- it's personal property. I mean, it's on -- the one on Youtube, the gentleman maintains that as his

own channel. It is his personal property to do with as he wants. Now, if the State would have contacted him, they may have been able to get a copy from him. Otherwise, you need a warrant to take someone's property. Intellectual property, that's -- and the same with hudok.info. You can listen to it there, you can stream it there, but you can't take it. And both were taken. And that's what my argument was with those, as well as the authentication and proper foundation to get them into evidence.

As I showed in there, that he had claimed -- and this was Tpr. Williams, he claimed that he had downloaded it on the 22<sup>nd</sup>, but the file itself was labeled as the 17<sup>th</sup>. So someone else had downloaded it, and he was claiming it was him. And he had no answer for that on the stand.

And I think that -- he said that I approved jury instructions. I mean, I made -- I'm not sure which he's talking about, if he's talking about the charge to the jury or the instructions. I asked for many things to be changed in the instructions, and got zero of them changed. So, you know, to say that I approved it would be a stretch, by far. You know, I -- even if just a few of the things would have been changed I would have been happy, even just "defendant" to my name would have been better than having "defendant" prejudicially scattered throughout.

And I do not think that, as we define "threat," I think

that, you know, the jury being laymen would have a problem in reading legalese contained within the code, and that the jury charge should have been written, or at least some other explanations given to let them know what it actually meant there, because I think a lot of them would have problems reading legalese. They're not trained in the law. I have problems reading it, and I read it all the time.

I mean, a lot of these are rights protected by the Constitution, and these rights say they shall not be abridged, they shall not be infringed, and any infringement or abridgment of them is a violation of that contract.

And I don't see anything else I need to say, I think. I think that was it. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. The first general heading could be described as insufficiency of the evidence, but, specifically, that no evidence of terroristic threat was communicated to the victim. The statute doesn't seem to require that, it merely needs to be made. There's no requirement that it be communicated to a victim. And I think from the phone conference it's clear that there was a threat that was communicated. It was communicated to several different people. I have never sat down and counted up how many people were on the phone call or the phone conference, but there were several people on that phone conference just listening to the phone conference.

The fact that no victim testified, again, the statute doesn't require it. In fact, several crimes, you know, there's no what one would, I guess, characterize as a traditional victim. Driving offenses, all the driving under the influence, driving on a revoked license, those don't have traditional victims. A felon in possession of a firearm, you know, there's no traditional victim. The victim is the State. There's a whole article under the criminal code that deal with crimes against the public policy, crimes against different things, other than crimes against a victim.

And so the Court doesn't believe that simply because a victim doesn't testify that that is any infirmity in this case.

Protected speech, it is black letter law that not all speech is protected. You cannot yell "fire" in a crowded theater. That's your traditional law school way of showing that not all speech is protected. And there's a case in West Virginia, State vs. Yocum, 233 W.Va. 439, and it discusses this statute. And, actually, in that case the challenge was void for vagueness. But one of the things that it talks about is permissible content based restrictions on speech, and it cites a U.S. Supreme Court case that says that certain categories of speech are considered to fall outside the protections afforded by the First Amendment, and they go on to list some of them: Incite imminent lawfulless -- lawless

action, obscenity, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, true threats. And so those are just some of the ones that are recognized types of speech that can be subject to restrictions, and therefore fall outside the broad protection of the First Amendment.

And the Court would find that this statute is a lawful restriction on that free speech.

Again, to deal with personam -- in personam jurisdiction and political jurisdiction, we've dealt with all those. No new allegations are made in the motion. And so the Court would stand on its prior ruling.

Also, the issue of error in the home confinement evidence. The Court made the analysis that it needed to under Rule 404(b), and it was admissible for an exception, and that was to establish that the phone call was made in Wood County and at a time when the defendant was in the home. A cautionary instruction was given. Certainly, a warrant, as the defendant has asserted here, could have been obtained. Whether it would show it or not, I don't know, because I don't know what a warrant would obtain if it was a phone call over the Internet, but it also would not show who was on the phone or who was using the Internet at the time. It would only show that the Internet or the phone was being used in that residence, but it wouldn't show who. And that's what the home confinement evidence did was it established who was

in the home at the time that the phone call was made.

In terms of the jail phone calls, the Court has already ruled that it was admissible under the statute that dealt with phone calls from the Regional Jail. There was no new evidence or argument made.

In terms of phone call from the Internet and the need for a warrant or no permission of the owner, of course, this is a fairly new, I think, area of the law. And so -- there is a West Virginia case that deals with things that are put out to the public, and the fact that no warrant is needed in <a href="State vs. Aldridge">State vs. Aldridge</a>, which is 172 W.Va. 218, 304 S.E.2d 671, a 1983 case by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. It talks about somebody who had committed a crime, and I'm not sure what the crime was and I don't know that it matters, but anyway, he had an injured hand. And the Court said that:

"A person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in what he knowingly exposes to the public."

And so, you know, if you knowingly expose a conversation to the public on the Internet, you have no expectation of privacy in that, and both of these were.

We have a couple federal cases, <u>United States vs.</u>

<u>Meregildo</u>, 883 F.Supp.2d 523, out of the Southern District of New York, 2012. It says:

"When a social media user disseminates his postings and information to the public, they

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are not protected by the Fourth Amendment."

A case out of New York, <u>People vs. Harris</u>, 36 Misc.3d 613,

945 N.Y.Supp.2d 505, a 2012 case, and it cites a 2<sup>nd</sup> Circuit case:

"That individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet postings or emails that have reached their recipient. Users would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in materials intended for publication or public posting."

And United States Court of Appeals from the  $6^{\text{th}}$  Circuit, a 2001 case, 255 F.3d 325:

"Users would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication or public posting. They would lose a legitimate expectation of privacy in an email that had already reached its recipient. It's analogous to a letter writer, whose expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery of the letter."

So the Court believes that posting these, either the phone call and/or this interview, on the Internet, that once that's done there is no more expectation of privacy, which, of course, is the hallmark standard for Fourth Amendment

analysis, and therefore no warrant would be required to copy them, extract them, however you want to say it. It doesn't matter, because there's no expectation of privacy.

In terms no proper foundation or authentication, of course, first, it's a Rule of Evidence, 901(b)(5), opinion about a voice, an opinion identifying a person's voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording based on hearing the voice at any other time under circumstances that would connect it with the alleged speaker. So that's really the standard.

There's a case, let's see, and this is another memorandum opinion by the Supreme Court, and, of course, I know it's not binding perhaps, but it's instructive. It's <a href="State vs. Spaulding">State vs. Spaulding</a>, 2015 WL 3875802, Slip Opinion No. 14-0718, and it cites Rule 901 concerning authentication. But it says:

"Preliminary questions of authentication and identification pursuant to Rule 901 are treated as matters of conditional relevance, and, thus, are governed by the procedures set forth in West Virginia Rule of Criminal -- or of Evidence 104(b). In an analysis under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 901 a trial judge must find that the party offering the evidence has made a prima facie showing that

Or the jury in this case:

there is sufficient evidence, 'to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.' In other words, the trial judge is required only to find that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification before the evidence is admitted. The trier of fact..."

"...determines whether the evidence is credible.

Further, a trial judge's ruling on authenticity will not be disturbed on appeal, unless there has been an abuse of discretion."

So ultimately it is the jury to decide whether the voice was that of the defendant. And the Court would conclude that, based upon their verdict, that they did so find.

So the Court believes that it has been properly authenticated and identified.

In terms of the ground as a continue due to a lack of disclosure of evidence, again, there's no evidence or allegation of prejudice. It's speculative and irrelevant at this point. In other words, I think you have to be specific in terms of this evidence was not presented, and this is how we're prejudiced. And so those issues can be brought up under Rule 35 or in a writ of habeas corpus if we get that far.

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In terms of the jury instructional error, this is a statutory offense. The instructions follow the statute, with added language that the defendant wanted. And, I mean, I know he made some wholesale objections to the charge, the Court overruled all those. But in terms of the actual jury instruction on the elements, I'm not aware, maybe he did and he can pursue that on appeal, but I'm not aware of any objection being made to those — to that instruction, the actual elements instructions. But he did want some clarification, and so the Court added a sentence or two or three that was given to the jury. And I was not aware of any other request for anything else, and so, you know, I can't rule on something that wasn't brought to the Court's attention. Either way, I think that everything was dealt with, and that the instruction was proper.

So based upon that then, the Court would deny the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, or for a new trial.

Mr. Deegan, do you have any evidence you wish to present on the issue of sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Just statements.

THE COURT: Okay. You may.

THE DEFENDANT: Do I get a rebuttal after the State goes?

THE COURT: Well, we'll see. I mean, I don't know that

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it's required, but I may very well give you the chance.

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I will stand by my statements over and over again that I never conveyed a threat of any kind or nature to any man or woman, period. There has never been a threat I've ever made in my entire life, let alone at this time being accused. I'm innocent of those charges.

I did grow a plant, that is true. For that offense I was serving time, and had served it dutifully without any problems of any nature or kind.

I have been confined now for close to twenty, twenty-two months roughly with no problems of any nature or kind, either at the North Central or on home confinement. I was actually at the fourteenth month mark when picked up by the State Police, and was actually eligible for parole and had put in for parole approximately two months before that on that first charge. I now have seven months in on this second charge.

I looked at the presentence investigation report. It appears that the index number stayed the same, which means that I'm no more a threat than I was last time. I would say I should be allowed to finish the original sentence pursuant to the contractual agreement with the State, and parole off it to the new charge.

And it appeared that in the presentence investigation report that alternative sentencing was available. I would ask for home confinement or probation on that. I would like to see them served concurrently. But I feel that as I'm not a threat, and the evidence, the property seized from my home, they tore the home apart, could not find any weapon of any kind. They've accused me many times of being dangerous, and yet have actually been unable to prove that I'm dangerous to society at large.

I've been in the regional for close to twelve months now, and I've watched people that actually murder people, harm people, molest children get out and go home. I've watched people commit violation after violation of home confinement and probation, and go back home. I am less of a threat than any of them. The index, if it can be trusted, shows I'm not really a threat to anyone.

The State's going to argue I'm this big monster. They have not proven that I'm a monster in any way, and the fact that they used and had zero evidence from my home to prove that I was a danger solidifies that. We had Steve Stephens, the head of home confinement, say I was a model client, never had any problems with me, and that he would take me back.

With that, I would just restate it, incorporate herein any and all of my arguments and/or papers that I've written as part of the public record creation-wide.

THE COURT: Mr. Rogers?

MR. ROGERS: In February of 2010, Thomas Deegan was arrested for growing not a plant, but sixty-three live

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marijuana plants. In March of 2010, the defendant was placed on bond. A hearing was set in February 2012, and the defendant didn't show, he absconded. There was a capias issued. The defendant didn't turn himself in. It wasn't until July of 2014 that the defendant was found by a deputy, and he was arrested. The defendant was sentenced in that case to one to five years to be served on home confinement.

We did hear that the defendant didn't test positive for drug while on confinement, and that he followed most of the rules while on home confinement. However, he did something much worse while on home confinement for his previous conviction, he plotted and made threats to take over the West Virginia state government. We heard the evidence of what he did while he was on home confinement. And I know the Court listened to all that evidence, so I won't go over all of it at length.

But we heard a conference call with a large number of people, and I believe that it was stated in that call that there as a guy on the call that had, I believe, sixty-some people just muted. So there were a large number of people on this call where Thomas Deegan was leading this conversation, where he told them that, "The soil has to be controlled, and it starts with West Virginia." He told them to Google Earth Charleston, West Virginia, to Google Earth the National Guard, the West Virginia State Police, and the Kanawha County

Sheriff's Department. He wanted them to know where these people were, and he told the military people that were on the call, "You know how to deal with these forces."

And I think the most chilling of the statements and the directives that this defendant gave while on this conversation, when asked what to do if police arrive, he stated, "The police are your enemy. And if you see the police coming and pulling in a vehicle, I suggest you shoot them." He had every intention of this being bloody.

The defendant made these threats on this conference call, and he did more than that. He actually planned and plotted and asked these people from all over the country, and we heard that there were some people who were planning to come from Arizona, from California, from Florida, from Texas, all over the country. And this was while he was on home confinement. These people were coming.

After we heard the conference call, we heard a video. It was taken approximately a week later, where he was interviewed by a guy out of Canada. He didn't back off of his plans to take over the West Virginia state government. The only thing he said is it wasn't going to go forward at this time, because there were federal operatives on the phone call and he was being watched. And he wouldn't be able to do it directly himself, but he would love to support somebody else who wants to do it. He planned on this going across the

United States, but it started with West Virginia. And we even heard that he planned on going to Charleston and violating his home confinement, because home confinement wouldn't mean anything at that point.

We then heard a phone call that he made while he was incarcerated. He knew he was guilty. He knew what he did was against the law, and he stated that. He was guilty under the statute.

The defendant hasn't shown -- and one of the most concerning points in this sentencing I think for the Court to consider, the defendant hasn't showed any remorse whatsoever. He doesn't see anything wrong with getting on a call and telling these at least tens, a number of people to come to Charleston, West Virginia, bring arms, and take over the state government, take people out of the capitol, shoot police. He sees nothing wrong with that.

The defendant hasn't taken responsibility for his comments, but he hasn't denied them either. We heard that he argues that he should be able to say whatever he wants to say. He hasn't taken responsibility. He hasn't denied it, but he absolutely has shown no remorse. He sees nothing wrong with what he did.

I think it's also telling, Your Honor, to look at the conduct that this defendant has shown in your courtroom. He kept saying he didn't understand, he kept giving the Court

issues. Some of them were valid, some of them he had issues and questions of the law, that's fine. But then we heard on phone conversations in the jail that he knew he was guilty, but he was still going to give the Court a hard time. He wanted to make a mockery of this Court. He wanted to slow down the process and waste the Court's time.

All these things that the defendant did, even though we did hear that he didn't violate all the rules of home confinement, that he didn't test positive for drugs while on home confinement, but these things that he did, plotting and threatening to take over the West Virginia state government, that was while he was on home confinement. That was while this Court gave him a second opportunity after he had been convicted for growing sixty-three live marijuana plants.

He states he isn't a threat to society at large, that some of these other people in jail with him are much more of a threat. But I would argue, and I think the jury found, and I think anybody listening would agree that it's a huge threat to society to get on a phone conversation with people from all over the country, tell them to come to Charleston, West Virginia, shoot our police, take our elected officials out of office, and take over the government, liquidate our assets. That's a huge threat, Your Honor, I would argue.

This defendant was given an opportunity on bond, he absconded. There was a capias issued. He didn't turn

himself in. And he fled, he didn't show up.

This defendant was given an opportunity on home confinement, as I've already stated. What did he do on home confinement? He plotted to take over the government, asked people to come down, shoot our police, kick our political -- our elected officials out.

For these reasons, Your Honor, I don't think there's any option but to send Thomas Deegan to jail. I think -- whenever I look at this, and he took a plea and was sentenced to one to five years for sixty-three live marijuana plants, but then what he did, you could argue, was much worse in trying to create all this violence and make these terroristic threats in our home state, and all the Court can give him is a one to three.

And for that reason, Your Honor, because he's been given all these opportunities, because the Court can only sentence this defendant to a one to three, I would ask that you impose the one to three sentence on this defendant, that you run it consecutive to a re-imposed sentence of his one to five for his home confinement revocation.

THE COURT: Mr. Deegan, anything you want to say in response?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Yeah. He was reading a lot from the complaint. That when questioned about his own complaint on the stand, admitted that he had no factual basis for it.

He did leave out the fact that pursuant to an Act of Congress, that we were declared enemies of our own country, and that by definition, you would be at war then. He didn't bring that up. He did say that I said, "If you see the police coming and pulling up in a vehicle, I suggest you shoot them." The word right there key is "suggest." Someone asked me. This was a discussion that was over the course of, I believe, ten or twelve phone calls that, as I had stated to the jury, it was like taking a two-minute segment out of a ten-minute call.

It was an educational process to where the people were informed of what had happened, why the egregious violations of our constitutions were happening nationwide. And people wanted to know, based upon the case that is still open in the Supreme Court of Appeals that I am a plaintiff in concerning violations of the Constitution by the state government and the elected officials thereof, how you go about correcting something when the ones that are in charge are the criminals. And so there was an open dialog.

I admit I had the phone call. I had several of them that they did not play, because it wouldn't have helped them any if the jury would have heard the entire process from beginning to end, starting in 1917 to present day. And, of course, I know that his duty as an attorney for the State is to only show what's beneficial for his client. But his

client is not alive, his client is not a person, it's a creature of the mind, an artificial abstraction as the Supreme Court has ruled over the course of our history in this country from 1795 on, and that I'm a live person here sitting. And that there was no actual harm.

And he failed to play the Thursday call, which was two days later, when I told him that the people misconstrued what was said, and there's a maxim of law, a slip of the tongue shall not be harshly punished. And during this hour call two days later, which they failed to provide as evidence because it wouldn't help their case any, I did state that my tongue had slipped several times in the passion of the argument in the phone call, and that the three of us that had sued the State and was still in suit with State would not support any violent actions, because we do not wish to see bloodshed. We were doing this for the benefit of our children, our grandchildren, and children of the communities that have a right to liberty, because without God there is no liberty. And there is no God left in this country at this point.

The two plaintiffs that I sued with, one is a school teacher, still employed, who sees no problem with me and is still actively assisting me in my defense, and the other is a retired postal worker. Both of them work for the government, and they see the problem with the government, they see the violations. That's why we sued.

And the Thursday call was our apology for things getting out of hand, as -- those in government need to have bigger budgets, they like to incite things in people. And in the heats of moment, many things are said by many people all over this country that would be crimes; that because it was said in the heat of the moment, the people understand that. Once again, a slip of the tongue should not be harshly punished.

In the complaint there's only one thing that he could actually quote that I said, and it was a slip of the tongue because I did not frame it properly, and that was, "If you see the police coming and pulling up in the vehicle, I suggest you shoot them." And it was not framed properly by me at the time, and it should have been. If I would have framed it properly, I would have said that our Congress declared us as enemies of the nation in '33 during the bankruptcy, and as an enemy by definition, you are at war, and you are permitted to take arms against the arms, another maxim of law, another time tested truth. You may take arms against the arms.

Now, I have never advocated violence. Like I said, when they tore my home apart the last time, they could not find any weapon of violence, or any evidence of any crime on any of my property. All they had was a portion of a -- I mean, we're looking at twenty-four to thirty hours of a phone call with the same people week-after-week discussing,

brainstorming the same problems facing our country.

It was a slip of the tongue. He says I'm not remorseful. The Thursday call quite clearly showed it, that's why he did not want it played. The portion that I got to play of the Monday call clearly showed that, no, this was not what I meant, people, and that people took it out of context. And that during the heat of the moment things were said that should have been worded better, should have been worded better.

You do have the right to defend yourself. You do have the right to defend your children. I never advocated any violence of any kind. There was active duty military that were on that call that had spoken to me personally. And being as they're active duty, that's part of the government. So part of it — the own structure itself said something is wrong, and wanted to know are the people looking for the change, because the military follows a civil order. The civil authority is the people.

And so I think he has shed a -- tried to shed a dark light upon me. I'm a person. I'm a human being. I'm a father. I'm a son. Just like everyone else here. And had the entire educational conference been played, and I did give him the entire and I did wish to seek all of them in there to be played. Of course, once listening to it I realized that the Court would rule that a lot of it had to do with the law,

and that the people can't understand the law, and that that's better left for the judges and the lawyers. And so I did not bother to bring it up. But they did play the following Monday call. They also played the Robert J. Morris call.

Yes, I said I would continue doing things, because you are allowed to protect your country, your state, and your children from infringements upon the God given and constitutionally protected rights of those people. You have a duty to protect them. You have a duty to make sure the children in your community are safe, and that the government, the elected officials are following their employment contract, the Constitution. He's failing to show and say that there are violations, outright violations by elected officials. We proved it in the West Virginia case that's still open, still open. And as a matter of fact, one of the parties has ruled on a matter in this case when he did not even have the authority to rule at that point, because he was a defendant and should have excused himself from it.

I'm not going to seek an appeal in any of these matters. I simply wanted the record corrected on both the PSI and other things. I wanted it so that I would have a chance to state what I thought, not just what the State and its employees thought throughout the record. I do not wish an appeal. I'm not going to waste the time of an appeal. There is nowhere to appeal it to at this point. And even if there

was, I still wouldn't appeal it. It is what it is at this point.

Now we're just trying to pick up the pieces of my life, because no one else's life has actually been affected. The trooper's life was not affected. The gentleman from the Fusion Center's life was not affected. There was not a single government official whose life was affected. Only mine, my children, and the children who have lost years and decades through violence by government and its officials in the oppression of the people. The people are the supreme power in our republican form of government. We have the right to speak out against it. Patrick Henney -- Henry made some beautiful statements against the British government that were much worse than mine ever were. And, you know, at points in time, debate, an open debate is required.

With that, once again I will say, I simply wanted the record correct on all of my documentation that I filed, that's all I wanted, my name proper. You know, if they want to do it in a proper format, that's fine; if not, I just wanted to say my side of things as the State and all of their employees always have their say.

The same with the presentence investigation. The one from last year I did not get to see, even though I was represented by counsel. There were many problems with that counsel. And I just wanted the record corrected since it is

part of a permanent record for people to see in the future.

That is all I wanted from it. I was not trying to be

sarcastic in any way as the trooper has said or non
remorseful, I just simply want the truth out there. And it

takes both sides to get to the truth.

With that, that's all I have to say. I've said that I think, you know, that I'm not a threat. The report shows it. It said that I was eligible for alternative sentencing. Once again, I'm just going to ask for that. I've done -- you know, I want to go home. I want to see my kids. I want to see my family, just as the State employees get to go home too.

And, once again, there was no one that can get up there and say that I harmed them in any way, shape or form. And with that, I think that I've been as remorseful as I can for doing something that I believe in. And no actual harm was caused by me upon any person or property at any time.

With that, I thank you for allowing me to speak. I think that I have tried to be as respectful as I could in fighting for my freedom. If I disrespected anyone in any way -- I even apologized to the cop. I felt bad about the way I had to treat him on the stand. But I was sitting here fighting for my life, and I think that anybody in my place would do the same. I'm not trying -- you know, we have differences of opinions, that's why we're human.

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But with that, I am a respectful person. I've tried to show as much respect here as I can. If I didn't show as much as you thought, it wasn't me on purpose, I'm just -- like I said, I wanted the record -- my side to be heard, that's all. With that, I thank you.

THE COURT: The Court would find, order and adjudge that the defendant is guilty by a finding of guilt by a jury in Case No. 16-F-25 of the offense of making terroristic threats, a felony, as contained in Indictment No. 16-F-25.

Pursuant to said finding, it is ordered that the defendant be committed to the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections for a term and period of not less than one nor more than three years, said sentence to begin as of April 14, 2016, and no fine.

The Court further finds, orders and adjudges that the defendant has violated his home confinement, and the sentence of home confinement in 11-F-101 is set aside, and the defendant's original sentence is reinstated.

It is accordingly ordered that the defendant be committed to the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections upon his conviction of manufacture of a controlled substance for a term and period of not less than one nor more than five years, said sentence to begin as of the completion of the sentence imposed above, with no fine.

The sentences are to be served consecutive to each

other, with the sentence of making terroristic threats to be served first.

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The defendant is entitled to 626 days credit, that is 348 days of actual confinement and 278 days of home confinement.

The Court would deny motion for probation or other alternative sentence. Of course, the biggest thing is, he was on home confinement for the commission of a felony when he committed this offense. And it's easy for the defendant to sit there and say he wasn't a threat, but this Court interprets the information in the evidence contrary to that. It's easy to say that it was a slip of the tongue when he said, "If you see law enforcement, shoot them." First of all, I don't think that's a slip of a tongue. But his other statements that he made in that phone call about Googling the sheriff's department in Kanawha County, Googling the I think it was the National Guard in Kanawha County, Googling the West Virginia State Police barracks, those were not slip of the tongues. When he said, "Those of you with military background, you know how to deal with them," that wasn't a slip of the tongue. That was planned language.

And so, you know, it's easy to sit here now and say you're not a threat. The problem is that when you get on a phone call with people from across the country and have a conversation that they had during that phone call, you put in

-- you put into action perhaps other people that may take it upon themselves to carry out the plan, even though you may withdraw the plan.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay to the Clerk of this Court the costs of this proceeding:

Clerk's Fee of \$150, Prosecuting Attorney Fee of \$35, Law

Enforcement Training Fund Fee of \$2, Community Corrections

Fee of \$10, Community Corrections Fund of \$25, Crime Victims

Compensation Fund Fee of \$50, Magistrate Court Fee of \$10,

Court Reporter Fee of \$120, Jury Fees of \$4,596.44.

There is no restitution. Said costs and counsel fees are to be paid within four years of the defendant's release.

All right. Mr. Deegan, you do have the right to appeal the decisions of this Court to the Supreme Court of this state. If you wish to appeal, you only have 120 days to file that appeal, and that is to be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. You must also file a document entitled "Notice of Intent to Appeal," and that must be filed within thirty days of today. And if you don't meet those deadlines, you may lose your right to appeal. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: You also have the right to file a motion for reconsideration or reduction of your sentence. You have 120 days to do that. And if you don't file your motion within

120 days, then you may lose your right to have a hearing and 1 a favorable ruling on that motion. Do you understand that? 2 3 THE DEFENDANT: Is that -- that would be with this 4 Court? 5 THE COURT: That is with this Court, that's correct. 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 7 THE COURT: You also have the right, if you wish, to 8 have court-appointed counsel to represent you in those 9 matters if you want an attorney and you cannot afford to hire an attorney. It is, however, your obligation to fill out the 10 necessary financial affidavit to show that you are 11 12 financially eligible for court-appointed counsel. All right. 13 THE DEFENDANT: Can I get some clarification on --14 THE COURT: What? 15 THE DEFENDANT: -- something? You said the conviction for terroristic threats starts today? 16 17 THE COURT: Yes. 18 THE DEFENDANT: And that's one to three? 19 THE COURT: Yes. THE DEFENDANT: Okay. And so the other credit, which 20 21 was six hundred and some days, right, I mean, six hundred and some total, that's credited to the one to five? 22 23 THE COURT: Well, the way I understand the law is that 24 when there's two sentences like this, that I just give a

credit for the sentences, and the Division of Corrections or

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Department of Corrections, whoever it is, makes the decision 1 as to how they're allocated. In other words, when they get 2 3 you into their custody, they're going to see a one to three and a one to five. And so it's my understanding that what 4 they say is, okay, that's a two to eight, and then they give 5 6 you those days' credit that you're entitled to receive, which 7 is 626 days. 8 THE DEFENDANT: As of today. 9 THE COURT: As of today. 10 THE DEFENDANT: So I would need to speak with the 11 Department of Corrections concerning that then, the 12 clarification of that, how it's awarded?

THE COURT: How it's allocated?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

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THE COURT: I would assume that they're the ones that would be able to assist you with that, yes. But the thing you need to keep in mind is that those 278 days on home confinement, I'm not sure -- those may come off the top and not off the bottom.

THE DEFENDANT: What do you mean by that?

THE COURT: Well, on a one to three and a one to five, you have to serve a minimum of two years --

THE DEFENDANT: Correct.

THE COURT: -- before you're eligible for parole. The home confinement may not go towards those two years.

11-F-101 & 16-F-25 - Sentencing Hearing (4/14/16)

1 THE DEFENDANT: According to the statutes I read, you do get credit for it even when it's revoked, because I did 3 check. THE COURT: Yeah, you get credit for it --4 5 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 6 THE COURT: -- but you don't credit -- you don't get credit towards your parole time, you get credit at the end of the sentence coming down towards where you actually discharge 8 your sentence. 10 Now, I don't work for the Division of Corrections, I 11 don't make those computations. I'm just going -- that's just 12 how I understand it. 13 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 14 THE COURT: But I may be wrong on that, because I don't 15 deal with it. I just impose it. 16 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 17 THE COURT: And they interpret them. THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 18 19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 20 (Proceeding ended at 10:28 a.m.) 21 22 23 24 25

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
COUNTY OF WOOD, to-wit:

I, Cynthia A. Sutphin, Certified Electronic Reporter and Transcriber for the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct partial transcript of the proceedings held in the matter of STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, Plaintiff vs. THOMAS DEEGAN, Defendant, Case Nos. 11-F-101 and 16-F-25, as recorded by me on the 14<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2016.

Given under my hand this  $4^{th}$  day of May.

CYNTHIA A. SUTPHIN, CER, CET

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, COUNTY OF WOOD, to-wit: I, Cynthia A. Sutphin, Certified Electronic Reporter and Transcriber for the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia, do hereby certify that the transcript within meets the requirements of the Code of the State of West Virginia, Chapter 51, Article 7, Section 4 and all rules pertaining thereto as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Appeals. DATED: 5/4/16